Chapter

Properties

David M. Armstrong

in Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics

Published in print July 2010 | ISBN: 9780199590612
Published online September 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191723391 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0002
Properties

Show Summary Details

Preview

Objective properties defended against various Nominalisms: Predicate, Class, Resemblance, ‘Ostrich’ Nominalisms. Properties may be thought to be universals or particulars (tropes). This work takes them to be universals. Ordinary particulars can be taken to be bundles of properties, but this work takes properties to be attributes and always instantiated. The Platonic view of properties as otherworldly entities is rejected for an ‘Aristotelian’ account. The good properties are ‘sparse’ (David Lewis) and should be postulated on the basis of our best science. It is argued that properties are contingent beings. W.E. Johnson's distinction between determinable and determinate universals is introduced and it is argued that determinables are not universals.

Keywords: properties; nominalism; universals; tropes; Plato; Aristotle; sparse properties; David Lewis; determinables; determinates; W.E. Johnson

Chapter.  5254 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.