Chapter

The (Non‐)Existence of Molinist Counterfactuals

William Hasker

in Molinism

Published in print November 2011 | ISBN: 9780199590629
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191731280 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590629.003.0002
The (Non‐)Existence of Molinist Counterfactuals

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This chapter reviews the main objections against the existence of the ‘counterfactuals of creaturely freedom’ featured by Molinism. The objections are (1) These (true) counterfactuals cannot exist because they fail to be grounded in reality (the ‘grounding objection’); and (2) If we assume that the counterfactuals do exist, their existence turns out to be incompatible with libertarian free will; thus, they are not counterfactuals of freedom. Each objection is stated, responses to the objections are explained, and there is some discussion of how the debate concerning the objections has developed. There are also tentative suggestions concerning how the discussion might be carried on beyond the point it has presently arrived at.

Keywords: Molinism; counterfactuals of freedom; grounding objection; Flint

Chapter.  5380 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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