Chapter

Truth and Molinism

Trenton Merricks

in Molinism

Published in print November 2011 | ISBN: 9780199590629
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191731280 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590629.003.0004
Truth and Molinism

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Molinism implies that, for every possible agent S in every possible circumstance C, there are true propositions like that if S were in C, S would freely do A. Thus Molinism implies that there are true counterfactuals of freedom. This chapter begins by responding to a single argument against the claim that there are true counterfactuals of freedom. But this response will lead to positive conclusions about—and even a new characterization of—Molinism itself. In particular, this chapter will conclude that Molinism's fundamental commitment is that the world is a certain way. And if the world is the way that the Molinist says it is, then a variety of counterfactuals of freedom are true—and true because of how the world is.

Keywords: Molinism; counterfactuals of freedom; truth; how the world is; grounding; centering; incompatibilism; bringing about the truth of

Chapter.  10556 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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