Chapter

Molinist Conditionals

Edwin Mares and Ken Perszyk

in Molinism

Published in print November 2011 | ISBN: 9780199590629
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191731280 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590629.003.0008
Molinist Conditionals

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This chapter distinguishes semantic and metaphysical problems facing Molinism. In the past thirty years, there has been a fair amount of uncertainty and confusion in the literature over the relationship between Molinist counterfactuals of freedom and the standard possible‐worlds semantics for counterfactuals. The authors show that Molinism is compatible with the standard semantics. They argue that two semantic arguments against Molinism‐the Might Argument and the Tie Argument—fail. Friends and foes of Molinism have typically failed to appreciate that the similarity relation that is appropriate to evaluate (both ‘would’ and ‘might’) counterfactuals is (unless they express strict conditionals) context-dependent. There is no one similarity relation that suits all contexts

Keywords: Molinism; middle knowledge; ccfs; Might Argument (MA); Tie Argument; possible‐worlds semantics; similarity relations; Lewis's semantics; Stalnaker's semantics

Chapter.  9600 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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