Chapter

Yet Another Failed Anti‐Molinist Argument

William Lane Craig

in Molinism

Published in print November 2011 | ISBN: 9780199590629
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191731280 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590629.003.0011
Yet Another Failed Anti‐Molinist Argument

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Perhaps the most serious objection to a Molinist theory of providence is that it is too successful in showing how God could sovereignly control a world of free creatures. For it must be fact how S would choose in C. But there may be an indefinite number of circumstances C* in which S would choose differently than in C. So God, by placing S in one of these circumstances C*, could bring it about that S choose freely whatever God wishes. This objection, however, is predicated upon a number of questionable assumptions. Zimmerman has retreated to a more modest version of the objection: if it is even possible that God finds Himself confronted with counterfactuals of freedom which afford Him perfect control of creatures by means of making seemingly irrelevant alterations in their circumstances, then creaturely freedom would not exist and God would find Himself incapable of creating free creatures. This chapter argues that Zimmerman's version is no more successful in undermining a Molinist account of providence

Keywords: Zimmerman; providence; Recombination Principle; counterfactuals of freedom; Molinism; divine control

Chapter.  8252 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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