Chapter

The Free Will Defense

Hugh J. McCann

in Molinism

Published in print November 2011 | ISBN: 9780199590629
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191731280 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590629.003.0016
The Free Will Defense

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This chapter is a critique of views that seek to resolve the problem of moral evil by holding that such evil is owing to exercises of human freedom that escape God's control as creator. It is argued that the three most common treatments of this kind are all unsatisfactory in that none of them provides sufficiently for God's omniscience and sovereignty. Boethian views preserve an omniscient God, but deprive him of any control over what exercises of creaturely freedom will occur. Openness theories deprive God of both omniscience and sovereignty. Finally, Molinist treatments largely fail to provide for either perfection, in that so‐called counterfactuals or subjunctives of freedom often lack grounding, and cannot be known by God prior to creation.

Keywords: Free Will Defense; Free Will Theodicy; Openness; Molina; moral evil; divine sovereignty; omniscience; counterfactuals (subjunctives) of freedom

Chapter.  11183 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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