Chapter

Conscious Events and Self-Ascriptions: Comments on Heal and O’Brien

Christopher Peacocke

in The Self and Self-Knowledge

Published in print April 2012 | ISBN: 9780199590650
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191741043 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590650.003.0009
Conscious Events and Self-Ascriptions: Comments on Heal and O’Brien

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This paper defend the principle, disputed by Jane Heal, that whenever someone consciously Fs and also has the concept F, then she will be able to judge explicitly, with non-inferential justification, that she Fs. The defense turns on the distinction between experiencing something as F, as opposed to having in consciousness manifestations of an otherwise unconscious state of F. Reasons are offered against her view that perceptual models can illuminate our knowledge of our unconscious states. Lucy O’Brien asks how my account of action awareness can work in cases of action types where failure is impossible. I offer an account of how it can work there too, and outline an account of the differences between apparent action awareness and apparent perceptual awareness.

Keywords: Keywords: tryings; action awareness; conscious states; reasons; justification

Chapter.  3727 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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