Chapter

One Variety of Self-Knowledge: Constitutivism as Constructivism<sup>*</sup>

Annalisa Coliva

in The Self and Self-Knowledge

Published in print April 2012 | ISBN: 9780199590650
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191741043 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590650.003.0011
One Variety of Self-Knowledge: Constitutivism as Constructivism*

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The paper presents and defends a specific variety of the constitutive account of self-knowledge of our propositional attitudes, labeled “constructivism”. It claims that such an account is suitable only for a limited amount of propositional mental states—those as commitments, as opposed to those as dispositions. It is argued that far from making the account irrelevant, its specificity points out that a complete account of our knowledge of our own mental states will have to be pluralistic, so as to respect the differences between various kinds of mental states in general and of propositional attitudes in particular, and of the diverse ways in which we do know them. In passing, it addresses the topic of self-deception, of psychological concepts’ mastery and of the role and semantic status of so-called “avowals”.

Keywords: self-knowledge; constitutivism; constructivism; commitments; dispositions; self-deception; psychological concepts’ mastery; avowals; transparency; authority

Chapter.  18715 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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