The paper presents and defends a specific variety of the constitutive account of self-knowledge of our propositional attitudes, labeled “constructivism”. It claims that such an account is suitable only for a limited amount of propositional mental states—those as commitments, as opposed to those as dispositions. It is argued that far from making the account irrelevant, its specificity points out that a complete account of our knowledge of our own mental states will have to be pluralistic, so as to respect the differences between various kinds of mental states in general and of propositional attitudes in particular, and of the diverse ways in which we do know them. In passing, it addresses the topic of self-deception, of psychological concepts’ mastery and of the role and semantic status of so-called “avowals”.
Keywords: self-knowledge; constitutivism; constructivism; commitments; dispositions; self-deception; psychological concepts’ mastery; avowals; transparency; authority
Chapter. 18715 words.
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