Chapter

Perceptual Causality, Counterfactuals, and Special Causal Concepts

Johannes Roessler

in Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation

Published in print October 2011 | ISBN: 9780199590698
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191731242 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590698.003.0004

Series: Consciousness & Self-Consciousness Series

Perceptual Causality, Counterfactuals, and Special Causal Concepts

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In this paper I contrast two views of causal understanding: a ‘particularist’ view, on which causal understanding is, partly but irreducibly, a matter of grasping what Anscombe called special causal concepts, vs a ‘generalist’ view, on which causal understanding consists in mastering the general concept of causation. I begin by formulating an intuitively attractive version of particularism due to P.F. Strawson, a central element of which is what I will call naïve realism concerning mechanical transactions. I present the account with two challenges. Both challenges reflect the worry that Strawson’s particularism may be unable to acknowledge the connection between causation and counterfactuals, as articulated by the interventionist approach to causation. I argue that Strawson’s naïve realism can accept what interventionism has to say about ordinary causal understanding.

Keywords: causation; counterfactuals; interventionism; perceptual causality; naive realism; special causal concepts

Chapter.  7886 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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