Chapter

Representationalism, First-Person Authority, and Second-Order Knowledge

Sven Bernecker

in Self-Knowledge

Published in print March 2011 | ISBN: 9780199590728
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191725456 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.003.0003
Representationalism, First-Person Authority, and Second-Order Knowledge

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter argues that, given the representational theory of mind, one cannot know a priori that one knows that p as opposed to being incapable of having any knowledge states; but one can know a priori that one knows that p as opposed to some other proposition q.

Keywords: a priori; anti-individualism; belief; contextualism; externalism; knowledge; memory; self-knowledge

Chapter.  10945 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.