Chapter

Anti-Individualism, Self-Knowledge, and Epistemic Possibility: Further Reflections on a Puzzle about Doubt

Gary Ebbs

in Self-Knowledge

Published in print March 2011 | ISBN: 9780199590728
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191725456 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.003.0004
Anti-Individualism, Self-Knowledge, and Epistemic Possibility: Further Reflections on a Puzzle about Doubt

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This chapter argues that we cannot have any justification for believing that a given description of a possible world w that is subjectively indistinguishable to us from the actual world supports anti-individualism unless we accept some substantive empirical beliefs that rule out for us that we are in w. This chapter concludes that if we take the standard Twin-Earth thought experiments to support anti-individualism, then we must reject the entrenched assumption that we can make sense of actually being in any possible world that is subjectively indistinguishable to us from the actual world.

Keywords: a priori; anti-individualism; belief; doubt; epistemic possibility; introspection; justification; knowledge; phenomenal experience; reasoning; self-knowledge; Twin Earth argument

Chapter.  13321 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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