McKinsey One More Time

Crispin Wright

in Self-Knowledge

Published in print March 2011 | ISBN: 9780199590728
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191725456 | DOI:
McKinsey One More Time

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The so‐called McKinsey paradox consists in the apparently valid derivation of apparently non‐apriori knowable propositions about the satisfaction of certain putative external conditions on content from apparently a priori knowable premises. This chapter returns to the suggestion that the correct diagnosis of this paradox discloses a failure broadly comparable to what goes wrong in Moore's notorious “Proof’ of an external world. The chapter offers a further exploration of the relevant notion of warrant transmission failure, then turns to sustain the proposed diagnosis of McKinsey in those terms, albeit with some qualifications.

Keywords: a priori; belief; externalism; justification; McKinsey paradox; reasoning; self-knowledge; warrant

Chapter.  12610 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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