Chapter

Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief

Brie Gertler

in Self-Knowledge

Published in print March 2011 | ISBN: 9780199590728
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191725456 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.003.0007
Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief

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Philosophers such as Gareth Evans and Richard Moran have argued that beliefs are transparent in that a rational thinker can determine whether she believes that p by directly considering whether p. Recently, Alex Byrne and Jordi Fernandez have proposed (independently) that this transparency method generates externalistically warranted second-order beliefs, and can thereby explain our privileged access to our beliefs. This chapter challenges these claims. The transparency method derives its appeal from an overly rationalistic conception of belief. But even those beliefs that satisfy this conception will not be revealed through the use of this method. Determining what we believe requires that we look inward.

Keywords: attention; belief; judgment; memory; privileged access; rationality; self-knowledge

Chapter.  10435 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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