Chapter

Viewing the Inner

Charles Travis

in Self-Knowledge

Published in print March 2011 | ISBN: 9780199590728
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191725456 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.003.0011
Viewing the Inner

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What Frege calls a ‘Vorstellung’ has two crucial defining features: for it to be is for it to belong to someone's consciousness; no Vorstellung is accessible to more than one consciousness. In ‘Der Gedanke’ Frege argues, convincingly, that Vorstellungen are not things on which the truth of a judgement might turn. Does this mean that we have no Vorstellungen? Or, worse yet, that we have, or at least experience, no inner life at all? Frege also shows how it does not mean that. It is just that our attitudes towards our inner life play different roles in that life being what it is than judgements play in our relation to the outer world. This chapter explores those differences in the case of visual experience; thus how such experience can be conceived when, and insofar as, it is not experience of our environment, hence not, or not exhaustively, perceiving.

Keywords: apperception; immunity to error; judgement; perception; sense; sense-data; thought; representation; visual appearing

Chapter.  14335 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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