The Emergence of Social Pacts

Sabina Avdagic

in Social Pacts in Europe

Published in print May 2011 | ISBN: 9780199590742
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191728891 | DOI:
The Emergence of Social Pacts

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Chapter 3 presents the first part of the book’s analytical framework and examines more closely the politics of pact making, moving away from countries as units of analysis to individual negotiation episodes. The aim is to understand the outcomes of negotiations. The chapter presents a heuristic model of pact creation that incorporates the concepts of bounded rationality and unstable preferences within a standard bargaining framework. Its central argument is that the outcome of pact negotiations depends primarily on actors’ perceptions of their relative power. The chapter identifies key indicators influencing these perceptions, and it outlines the main predictions of negotiation outcomes. The model suggests that where power disparities are visible but not excessively large, negotiations are likely to result in pacts. By contrast, where both leading negotiating parties believe that their respective position is strong (or alternatively weak), negotiations have a higher chance of failure.

Keywords: social pacts; negotiations; bounded rationality; preferences; power perceptions; risk

Chapter.  7290 words. 

Subjects: European Union

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