Chapter

The Aggregation of Intentional Attitudes

Christian List and Philip Pettit

in Group Agency

Published in print April 2011 | ISBN: 9780199591565
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191725494 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591565.003.0003
The Aggregation of Intentional Attitudes

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It may be possible in principle for a group to constitute an agent, meeting the conditions set out in Chapter 1. But how can it do so in practice? In particular, how can it do so, assuming that the group's attitudes are to be generated by the attitudes of members? To answer this question, the chapter introduces some results on the aggregation of judgments and of attitudes more generally. Those results show that suitable attitude aggregation is more difficult than it might have seemed; it cannot be achieved, for example, by majority voting and other ‘propositionwise independent’ methods of aggregation, which might lead a group to hold inconsistent attitudes. But the results presented also point to ways in which these difficulties can be avoided and group agents constructed.

Keywords: judgment; preference; aggregation; majority voting; social choice; consistency; impossibility results; possibility results

Chapter.  7951 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Metaphysics

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