Chapter

Possibilities for Representation and Credence: Two Space‐ism versus One Space‐ism

Frank Jackson

in Epistemic Modality

Published in print June 2011 | ISBN: 9780199591596
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729027 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591596.003.0005
Possibilities for Representation and Credence: Two Space‐ism versus One Space‐ism

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Many sentences represent the kind of world we inhabit, in the sense of providing putative information about it. For each such sentence, there is a set of possibilities, ways things might be, which are in accord with how things are being represented to be by the sentence, and which are such that the credence we give the sentence's being true is the sum of the credences we give to each of the possibilities being actual. Some say that, in fleshing out this attractive picture, we have to draw on the distinction between what's metaphysically possible and what's conceptually possible. This chapter argues that this is a mistake.

Keywords: representation; information; metaphysical possibility; conceptual possibility; A-intensions; C-intensions

Chapter.  7149 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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