Chapter

Nonfactualism about Epistemic Modality

Seth Yalcin

in Epistemic Modality

Published in print June 2011 | ISBN: 9780199591596
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729027 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591596.003.0011
Nonfactualism about Epistemic Modality

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The standard view about epistemic modals includes a commitment to both descriptivism and factualism. Descriptivism is the thesis that epistemic modal talk serves fundamentally to describe some feature of reality. Factualism is the view that there is a certain class of facts, the facts about what is (epistemically) possible, or probable, or necessary. This chapter aims to develop an alternative to the factualist picture. The positive account the chapter sets out could plausibly be called a kind of expressivism about epistemic modal discourse, and a kind of nonfactualism about epistemic modality.

Keywords: epistemic modals; expressivism; factualism; nonfactualism; descriptivism; Moore's paradox

Chapter.  18919 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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