Chapter

Objections to Extended Reliability

Sanford C. Goldberg

in Relying on Others

Published in print September 2010 | ISBN: 9780199593248
Published online September 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191594625 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593248.003.0006
Objections to Extended Reliability

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This chapter defends the ‘extendedness hypothesis,’ according to which the process by which testimonial beliefs are formed is interpersonal in extent, against a variety of objections. In the course of this discussion, various matters are addressed, including the relationship between the extendedness hypothesis and the “extended mind” hypothesis in the philosophy of mind, the conditions on doxastic justification for belief‐dependent processes, the nature of the vice of credulity, and the causal antecedents of testimonial belief.

Keywords: extended mind; testimonial justification; belief‐dependence; credulity; testimonial belief; reliabilism

Chapter.  17802 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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