Chapter

Self‐No‐Self ? Memory and Reflexive Awareness

Evan Thompson

in Self, No Self?

Published in print December 2010 | ISBN: 9780199593804
Published online January 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191595691 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593804.003.0006
Self‐No‐Self ? Memory and Reflexive Awareness

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This chapter examines the so-called ‘memory argument’ for reflexive awareness in the Yogacara-Madhyamaka school of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophy. According to this argument, when one remembers one recalls both the past object and the past experience of this object, thus no additional higher-order cognition is required in order to recall the subjective side of the original experience, hence reflexive self-awareness or self-cognition belonged to the original experience. Husserlian phenomenology is used to defend the memory argument against rival Buddhist views that deny reflexive awareness, but it is also argued that such a phenomenological defense exerts pressure on certain versions of the Buddhist no-self doctrine.

Keywords: memory argument; reflexive awareness; self-awareness; phenomenology

Chapter.  7021 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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