Chapter

The Mental Transparency Assumption

Peter Carruthers

in The Opacity of Mind

Published in print September 2011 | ISBN: 9780199596195
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191731549 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596195.003.0002
The Mental Transparency Assumption

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This chapter explains and discusses the assumption that minds are transparent to themselves (in a way that they aren't, of course, transparent to other people). Some such assumption has been perennially tempting across time and place, and continues to exert a powerful influence today, especially in philosophy. Indeed, an implicit transparency assumption might be an innately channeled property of the human mind. One goal of the chapter is to explain away our common-sense intuitions of mental transparency, thereby leveling the playing field between the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory and its competitors. Another goal is to show that the conflict between transparent-access accounts and the ISA theory cannot be avoided by consigning them to different explanatory levels or “spaces”.

Keywords: authority; Cartesian; explanatory level; innate; personal; privilege; processing rule; split-brain; subpersonal; transparency; transparent

Chapter.  18811 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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