Chapter

Transparent Sensory Access to Attitudes?

Peter Carruthers

in The Opacity of Mind

Published in print September 2011 | ISBN: 9780199596195
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191731549 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596195.003.0004
Transparent Sensory Access to Attitudes?

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This chapter critiques theories that purport to be consistent with the sensory-access component of the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory, but which maintain that the sensory events in question give us transparent, non-interpretive, access to our own attitudes. One of these theories claims that our knowledge of our own attitudes should be arrived at by looking outward, into the world, rather than by looking inward, into ourselves. Another claims that transparent self-knowledge can be achieved by expressing our attitudes directly into speech. And the third claims that our beliefs about our own attitudes can constitute, or bring it about, that we possess attitudes of the sort in question, no matter how those beliefs are initially arrived at.

Keywords: constitutive-authority; expressivism; inner speech; interpretation; interpretive; outward-looking; revisionary; sensory-access; System 2; transparent

Chapter.  21674 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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