Metacognition and Control

Peter Carruthers

in The Opacity of Mind

Published in print September 2011 | ISBN: 9780199596195
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191731549 | DOI:
Metacognition and Control

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This chapter examines predictions made by inner sense theories that derive from the supposed control functions of inner sense, contrasting them with the predictions of the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory. It is argued that people lack the sorts of native metacognitive capacities that inner sense theory predicts, and likewise that they lack such capacities to monitor and control their own reasoning. The chapter also considers whether recent evidence of metacognitive capacities in nonhuman animals conflicts with one of the main commitments of the evolutionary argument for the ISA theory. This is that metarepresentational capacities evolved initially for outward-looking social purposes.

Keywords: confidence; control; epistemic emotion; metacognition; metamemory; monitoring; reasoning; primates; social; System 2; uncertainty

Chapter.  16578 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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