Chapter

Escaping Joint-Decision Traps

Arthur Benz

in The EU's Decision Traps

Published in print May 2011 | ISBN: 9780199596225
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729140 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596225.003.0012
Escaping Joint-Decision Traps

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This chapter compares multilevel governance in the EU and in federal systems of nation states. While federal states use a variety of modes of intergovernmental coordination of policies, patterns of joint-decision making can be found most often when constitutions are amended. A comparative analysis of selected cases of constitutional reform reveals that institutional change is facilitated by an appropriate design of negotiations. Under particular conditions, constitutional policy provides an escape from the joint-decision trap. In the EU, the Convention process indicates a new arena for constitutional negotiations that support a successful reform of decision rules. However, this approach, as well as the simplified procedure in the Intergovernmental Conference, comes to its limits if powers for particular policies are to be changed by Treaty amendment.

Keywords: constitutional policy; Convention; federal state; intergovernmental coordination; multilevel governance; negotiation; Treaty amendment

Chapter.  8558 words. 

Subjects: European Union

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