Chapter

Agency and Luck

Joseph Raz

in Luck, Value, and Commitment

Published in print June 2012 | ISBN: 9780199599325
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191741500 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.003.0006
Agency and Luck

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An examination of Williams account of agent-regret leads to its supplementation, and to an explanation of why we are attached to, and responsible for, some of our actions even when we do not control them, by relating our attachments to the emerging sense of who we are. These reflections lead to showing (a) that the control principle of responsibility reaches further than is often assumes, e.g. to establish responsibility for some beliefs and emotions, and (b) that we are responsible for actions regarding which the control principle does not apply. The chapter defends a rational functioning principle of responsibility. It concludes with some observations about how these conclusion bear on the question of blameworthiness which follow in Williams's footsteps.

Keywords: responsibility; Bernard Williams; moral luck; agent-regret; Robert Adams; controlling actions; rational guidance; blameworthiness

Chapter.  13162 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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