Similarity without Concepts

Christopher Gauker

in Words and Images

Published in print June 2011 | ISBN: 9780199599462
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729225 | DOI:
Similarity without Concepts

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This chapter addresses several arguments to the effect that similarity relations can be recognized only by means of concepts. First, it is argued that we can recognize that x is more like y than like z even when this cannot be accounted for by appeal to a property that x and y share that z lacks. Second, it argued that we do not need to think of representations as conceptual in order to define a kind of correctness. A sense in which a mark in perceptual similarity space may accurately represent an object or scenario is defined. Finally, it shown that Tversky's well-known account of similarity in terms of shared and differentiating features is not well supported by his experimental results.

Keywords: similarity judgments; objective quality space; perceptual representation; perceptual illusions; Tversky; Gleitman

Chapter.  15849 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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