Chapter

Intentions and <i>Mens Rea</i>

Michael Moore

in Placing Blame

Published in print July 2010 | ISBN: 9780199599493
Published online September 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191594649 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599493.003.0011
Intentions and Mens Rea

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No one just intends – they intend that something be the case. Intentions take objects, they have content, they exhibit Intentionality. This fact about the psychology of intentions becomes important because the gradations in culpability explored in chapter 9 depend on there being some non-arbitrary way to individuate intentions by their objects. Three views of these objects – in terms of real world objects, sentences, or propositions – are considered. A moral test (in terms of non-identical in fact but equivalent in morality intentions) that would bypass these thorny metaphysical issues is also considered but rejected.

Keywords: direct intentions; oblique intentions; specific intent; general intent; intent individuation; content of intention; closeness doctrine; propositional objects

Chapter.  13181 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

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