Chapter

Causation and the Excuses

Michael Moore

in Placing Blame

Published in print July 2010 | ISBN: 9780199599493
Published online September 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191594649 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599493.003.0012
Causation and the Excuses

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Excuses are seen as what are needed to move from prima facie culpability, to actual culpability. Excuses give the conditions under which an otherwise culpable choice is not blameworthy (either at all, or to a lesser degree). The nature of excuses, the kinds of excuses there are, and the nature of a theory of them, constitute the topics preliminarily explored in this chapter. A causal theory of excuse is elaborated at length, including the facets of such a theory that make it tempting to some. The causal theory is then rejected both on the ground that it does not fit established categories of excuse, and on the ground that it is morally implausible. The combination of such a theory of excuse with determinism is considered at length.

Keywords: excuse; compulsion; ignorance; determinism; compatibilism; dualism; linguistic dualism; capacity; opportunity

Chapter.  28647 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

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