An Overview of The Criminal Law’s Theory of The Person

Michael Moore

in Placing Blame

Published in print July 2010 | ISBN: 9780199599493
Published online September 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191594649 | DOI:
An Overview of The Criminal Law’s Theory of The Person

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Once one sees that criminal law presuppose that those subject to it must at least be rational agents, the subject of the previous chapter, the question arises as to what other fundamental attributes the law might suppose persons to have. The chapter explores a number of such features: autonomy (in four different senses), emotionality, unified character, unified consciousness, and Intentionality. Some further features are often assumed to be presupposed about persons by the law, namely freedom of the will, mind-stuff existing outside the natural world, souls, and the like; but these are rejected as legal presuppositions about persons and moral agency.

Keywords: Intentionality; character; autonomy; free will; emotionality; consciousness; souls

Chapter.  11679 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

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