Chapter

<i>Mens Rea</i>, Logic, and the Brain

Gert-Jan Lokhorst

in Law and Neuroscience

Published in print February 2011 | ISBN: 9780199599844
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191725227 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599844.003.0003

Series: Current Legal Issues

Mens Rea, Logic, and the Brain

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter discusses some recent work in the artificial intelligence and law community on the logic of mens rea ascriptions. It extends this work to give an account of quantified mens rea ascriptions in the sense in which they have been discussed in the legal literature. It studies the consequences of this work for neuroscience. The chapter argues that it is logically impossible to derive de re ascriptions of mens rea — as opposed to de dicto ascriptions — from neuroscientific evidence. In other words: the distinction between wide and narrow scopes in propositional attitude ascriptions, of which logicians have been aware for a long time, has dramatic consequences for the scope and limits of neuroscience in areas that are of interest to the law.

Keywords: artificial intelligence; law; mens rea ascriptions; neurosceince

Chapter.  5699 words. 

Subjects: Medical and Healthcare Law

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.