Chapter

The Luck Problem for Compatibilists

Neil Levy

in Hard Luck

Published in print July 2011 | ISBN: 9780199601387
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729256 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199601387.003.0004
The Luck Problem for Compatibilists

Show Summary Details

Preview

Chapter 3 argued that if compatibilism was not subject to a luck objection, a libertarianism that borrows very heavily from compatibilism could also see off the problem. Chapter 4 begins the argument for the claim that compatibilism, too, is unacceptably subject to luck. This chapter focuses on historically sensitive compatibilisms, according to which agents must take responsibility for the springs of their actions in order to be morally responsible for them. It argues that these kinds of compatibilism are unacceptably subject to luck: the very actions that are supposed to allow agents to take responsibility for their constitution either express that constitution or are unacceptably subject to present luck.

Keywords: compatibilism; historical compatibilism; Mele; Ishtiyaque Haji; John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza; constitutive luck

Chapter.  10829 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.