Chapter

The Epistemic Dimensions of Control

Neil Levy

in Hard Luck

Published in print July 2011 | ISBN: 9780199601387
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729256 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199601387.003.0005
The Epistemic Dimensions of Control

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This chapter turns to the epistemic dimensions of control. It is argued that these conditions are very demanding: moral responsibility for an action requires that the agent understands that, and how, the action is sensitive to her behaviour, as well as appreciation of the significance of that action or culpable ignorance of these facts. Precisely the same condition applies to culpable ignorance itself: holding agents to be responsible for their ignorance requires the identification of some act regarding which they possessed the relevant beliefs. It follows that culpable ignorance is much rarer than most philosophers think.

Keywords: control; knowledge; culpable ignorance; William Fitzpatrick; doxastic voluntarism

Chapter.  9691 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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