Akratic Freedom?

Neil Levy

in Hard Luck

Published in print July 2011 | ISBN: 9780199601387
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729256 | DOI:
Akratic Freedom?

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Chapter 5 argued that agents are not blameworthy for wrongful actions when they genuinely believe them to be best, all things considered, and are not culpable for that belief. It follows that blame requires that agents act akratically: since we are directly blameworthy only for wrongful actions which we perform despite judging we ought not to, we are directly responsible only for akratic actions. Chapter 6 argues that we are not responsible even for our akratic actions. It examines a variety of different approaches to akrasia. On some approaches, agents fail wholeheartedly to judge that they ought to act otherwise than they do, on others they are compelled to act as they do. The chapter concludes by arguing that akratic actions are lucky actions, and that this is responsibility-undermining luck.

Keywords: weakness of will; judgment; desire; Michael Smith; capacities; blame

Chapter.  9758 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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