Chapter

Being Metaphysically Unsettled

Matti Eklund

in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics

Published in print February 2011 | ISBN: 9780199603039
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191725418 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603039.003.0004

Series: Oxford Studies in Metaphysics

Being Metaphysically Unsettled

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This chapter discusses the defence of metaphysical indeterminacy by Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams and discusses a classical and bivalent theory of such indeterminacy. Even if metaphysical indeterminacy arguably is intelligible, Barnes and Williams argue in favour of it being so and this faces important problems. As for classical logic and bivalence, the chapter problematizes what exactly is at issue in this debate. Can reality not be adequately described using different languages, some classical and some not? Moreover, it is argued that the classical and bivalent theory of Barnes and Williams does not avoid the problems that arise for rival theories.

Keywords: vagueness; indeterminacy; metaphysical indeterminacy; bivalence; classical logic; supervaluationism; fuzzy logic

Chapter.  9241 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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