Chapter

Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vague Existence

Richard Woodward

in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics

Published in print February 2011 | ISBN: 9780199603039
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191725418 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603039.003.0006

Series: Oxford Studies in Metaphysics

Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vague Existence

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This chapter examines whether the ‘multiple actualities’ account of metaphysical indeterminacy developed by Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams can allow for cases in which it is metaphysically indeterminate whether an object exists. Having focused on Theodore Sider's argument to the conclusion that indeterminacy in existence is incoherent, the multiple actualities framework is shown to offer a way of understanding indeterminate existence that undercuts Sider's argument.

Keywords: metaphysical indeterminacy; vague existence; possible worlds; possibilia; existence

Chapter.  4761 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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