Chapter

Omniprescience and Tough Choices

E. J. Coffman

in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 3

Published in print February 2011 | ISBN: 9780199603213
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191725388 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603213.003.0003

Series: Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion

Omniprescience and Tough Choices

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Several philosophers have argued that an omniprescient person could not act in certain ways. This chapter presents and assesses what may be the most promising such argument: the Tough Choices Argument (TCA). The TCA concludes that an omniprescient person could not make a tough choice—i.e., a choice between alternative courses of action in light of knowledge that none is uniquely reasonable. The TCA derives from an argument due to Tomis Kapitan; and the objection to the TCA developed in this chapter superficially resembles a reply to Kapitan's argument due to David Hunt. Along the way, then, the chapter discusses Kapitan's argument, and Hunt's reply, to show how they differ (respectively) from the TCA and the objection to it developed herein.

Keywords: omniprescience; omniscience; God; deliberation; choice; decision; intentional action; freedom; theism; determinism

Chapter.  6204 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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