Hiddenness, Evidence, and Idolatry

E. J. Coffman and Cervantez Jeff

in Evidence and Religious Belief

Published in print July 2011 | ISBN: 9780199603718
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729287 | DOI:
Hiddenness, Evidence, and Idolatry

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In important recent work in religious epistemology, Paul Moser develops a multifaceted reply to a prominent attack on belief in God—the so called Hiddenness Argument. This chapter raises a number of worries about Moser’s novel treatment of the Hiddenness Argument. After laying out the version of that argument Moser most explicitly engages, the chapter explains the four main elements of Moser’s reply and argues that his reply stands or falls with two pieces in particular—the Purposively Available Evidence Argument and the Cognitive Idolatry Argument. It is shown that the Cognitive Idolatry Argument fails, leaving the Purposively Available Evidence Argument as Moser’s only potentially viable objection to the Hiddenness Argument. The chapter concludes that Moser’s treatment of the Hiddenness Argument depends crucially on controversial epistemological claims about certain of our moral beliefs, and is thus considerably more vulnerable than many have recognized.

Keywords: evidence; God; hiddenness; religious epistemology; idolatry; theism; atheism; Paul Moser

Chapter.  9090 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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