Chapter

Divine Perfection and Freedom

William Rowe

in Evidence and Religious Belief

Published in print July 2011 | ISBN: 9780199603718
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729287 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603718.003.0011
Divine Perfection and Freedom

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This chapter argues that the requirements for absolute moral perfection and freedom that theists traditionally ascribe to God cannot be met, and hence that traditional theism should be rejected. Robert Adams’ contention that God need not create the best world God can is explored and rejected, as is the claim by Norman Kretzmann (following Aquinas) that the fact that God cannot create the best possible world (because there is no such world) does not threaten God’s moral perfection. On the contrary, this chapter argues that if God creates a world but could create a better one, then it is possible for there to be a being greater than God; and so the fact that there is no best possible world and that for any possible world there is a better one means that we should conclude that God does not exist.

Keywords: Robert Adams; Norman Kretzmann; Aquinas; divine perfection; best possible world

Chapter.  6356 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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