Chapter

Fitting-attitude Analysis

Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen

in Personal Value

Published in print June 2011 | ISBN: 9780199603787
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729294 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603787.003.0002
Fitting-attitude Analysis

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We cherish, promote, desire etc, what is valuable which might suggest that are numerous value concepts—one each, say, for objects that ought to be cherished, promoted, etc. This chapter considers a pattern of value analysis which purports to do the contrary thing, namely to bring all of these valuable things under one and the same roof. After a brief historical outline of two of the more important architects behind this so-called Fitting-attitude analysis of value, the core features of as well as some classic objections to the analysis are delineated. The theory proposed here follows this pattern; it gives primacy to normative concepts (such as reason and fittingness) over evaluative concepts. In other words, it reduces evaluative claims to deontic claims about attitudes that it is fitting to have, or that one ought to have, or that we have reason to adopt to the valuable objects.

Keywords: Fitting‐attitude analysis; Buck‐passing; Franz Brentano; A.C. Ewing; extrinsic value; final value; supervenience; constitution; value source

Chapter.  8145 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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