Chapter

The Wrong Kinds of Reason

Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen

in Personal Value

Published in print June 2011 | ISBN: 9780199603787
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729294 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603787.003.0003
The Wrong Kinds of Reason

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One objection stands out as being particularly troublesome to Fitting attitude analyse of value. If we want to distinguish the right kinds of reason from the wrong kind (where only the former justify value ascriptions), which it seems we must do, we ought to be able to say what makes a reason right or wrong. However, there is, the objection goes, no satisfactory way of doing this. This chapter examines a popular general approach to the problem that sets out from Derek Parfit's distinction between state‐given and object‐given reasons for attitudes to the so‐called wrong kind of reason problem. It is argued that it is questionable whether this approach solves the problem. Chapter 3 also discusses Roger Crisp's recent suggestion that goodness, or value, is not itself a reason providing property. It is showed in which way Fitting attitude analysts may or may not throw this idea overboard.

Keywords: Wrong kind of reason problem; state‐ and object‐given reason; holding‐ and content‐reason

Chapter.  7337 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Metaphysics

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