Problems and Possibilities

Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen

in Personal Value

Published in print June 2011 | ISBN: 9780199603787
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729294 | DOI:
Problems and Possibilities

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Chapter 8 discusses whether personal values might have more than one side—one facing the person a for whom the value is ‘personal’ and another facing the rest of us (at any rate, those who have a reason to favour the object for a's sake). It also responds to some objections and counter-examples. For instance, if values are understood in terms of the existence of agent-relative reasons, the analysis defended in this work seems to imply interpersonal value incompatibility, i.e. that different persons will have values that are incompatible. Since it is reasonable to assume that people we dislike have personal values, the analysis seems to imply that we are obliged to care for people that we dislike, which is counter‐intuitive. In this connection Stephen Darwall's approach to welfare is considered. An objection to fitting‐attitude analyses of good‐for recently raised by Chris Heathwood is discussed. Finally, the role of personal values in a good life is considered.

Keywords: Janus values; pro tanto reason; rational care; considerative value; inverted‐commas judgement; good life; fetishism

Chapter.  9646 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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