One Reason Dichotomy Less?

Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen

in Personal Value

Published in print June 2011 | ISBN: 9780199603787
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729294 | DOI:
One Reason Dichotomy Less?

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It would come in handy if we could understand the distinction between personal and impersonal values in terms of the much‐discussed agent‐relative/neutral dichotomy. This chapter examines the latter distinction, and it argues that we should be cautious about such an approach. A particular feature of reasons — referred to as the personalizability feature plays an important role in Chapter 9. This feature challenges the advocate of agent-neutral reasons to give us an account of it. Several different responses to this challenge are considered, including a promising one that sets out from Jonathan Dancy's distinction between favourers and enablers.

Keywords: agent‐relative; agent‐neutral; motivating reason; explanatory reason; normative reason; complete reason

Chapter.  14855 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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