Chapter

The Status and Future of Character‐Based Virtue Epistemology

Jason Baehr

in The Inquiring Mind

Published in print June 2011 | ISBN: 9780199604074
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729300 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604074.003.0010
The Status and Future of Character‐Based Virtue Epistemology

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This chapter draws together several elements of the preceding chapters by considering their implications for the viability of the four main varieties of character‐based virtue epistemology outlined in Chapter 1. The main focus is the weaker and stronger versions of autonomous virtue epistemology. The stronger version maintains that an immediate or autonomous focus on intellectual virtues and their role in the cognitive life should replace or supplant traditional epistemological theorizing. The weaker version considers an immediate theoretical concern with intellectual virtues a proper complement to traditional epistemology. It is argued, contra Jonathan Kvanvig (1992), that the stronger version of autonomous virtue epistemology is unwarranted, but that the weaker version has considerable promise, and indeed that it likely represents the way of the future in character‐based virtue epistemology.

Keywords: varieties of virtue epistemology; prospects of virtue epistemology; autonomous virtue epistemology; new directions in virtue epistemology; Jonathan Kvanvig

Chapter.  6251 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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