Chapter

Knowledge as Expertise

Gill Mary Louise

in Philosophos

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199606184
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191741890 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606184.003.0005
Knowledge as Expertise

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Chapter 4 argues that the Theaetetus seeks to define knowledge as expertise, the genus to be divided in the search for the sophist, statesman, and philosopher. The genus is defined by analysis into its elementary parts according to the second of three notions of account (logos) in the last part of the dialogue. The Theaetetus ends in apparent failure, having tried to identify knowledge with perception, true judgment, or true judgment with an account, but a constructive solution is permitted by conceiving of knowledge as expertise, defined as a combination of those components. A problem remains about how to distinguish knowledge from belief, and this chapter argues that Plato provides the resources to distinguish them: the difference turns on the aspects of the object perceived and the account that grounds a correct matching of the object perceived to the perceiver’s mental impression of it.

Keywords: Theaetetus; knowledge; expertise; perception; truth; judgment; belief; impression; account; analysis

Chapter.  21568 words. 

Subjects: Ancient Philosophy

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