Consciousness, Reason, and Intentionality

Richard Tieszen

in After Gödel

Published in print May 2011 | ISBN: 9780199606207
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191725500 | DOI:
Consciousness, Reason, and Intentionality

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The chapter opens with an account of serious deficiencies in recent treatments of human consciousness in the philosophy of mind and epistemology. These deficiencies, it is argued, affect our view of the place of reason in mathematics and logic. A discussion of general features of reason, according to the rationalist tradition in philosophy, ensues. The reader is reminded of how a type of conception that includes a capacity for universalization and generalization is associated with rationalist views of reason. Reason has also been considered a source of clarity, exactness, idealization, objectivity, and optimism in problem-solving. The capacity for a kind of rational intuition (which Husserl calls “categorial” intuition) has been embraced by a number of rationalists. A very important feature of reason, according to Husserl, is that it exhibits intentionality. A theory of intentionality is sketched and the “intentional difference principle,” which is pivotal for the remaining chapters, is introduced

Keywords: rationalism; conception; universalization; generalization; exactness; idealization; objectivity; optimism; intentionality; meaning

Chapter.  16984 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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