Reason, Science, and Evidence

Richard Tieszen

in After Gödel

Published in print May 2011 | ISBN: 9780199606207
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191725500 | DOI:
Reason, Science, and Evidence

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This chapter takes up two important topics concerning the kind of platonic rationalism developed in earlier parts of the book. First, it explores some of the differences between the views of Gödel and the kind of pragmatic holism that has been set forth by W. V. Quine and some of his followers. Gödel's ideas about the extrinsic justification of mathematical axioms have been associated with Quine's views in some of the literature on the intrinsic/extrinsic evidence distinction. Various problems with the attempt to assimilate Gödel to Quine's holistic empiricism are pointed out. Second, an effort is made to show how constituted platonism is not subject to the excesses of earlier types of rationalism. The point, as Gödel suggests in his 1961 text, is to go between the extremes of unsupportable ‘eftward’ empiricist positions on the foundations of mathematics and logic and dubious ‘rightward’ metaphysical positions.

Keywords: Quine; holism; rationalism; extrinsic justification; Gödel; empiricism; evidence; science; epochē; skepticism

Chapter.  12892 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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