Chapter

Legal Judgments as Plural Acceptances of Norms

Kevin Toh

in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law

Published in print June 2011 | ISBN: 9780199606443
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729683 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606443.003.0003

Series: Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law

Legal Judgments as Plural Acceptances of Norms

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This chapter proposes an expressivist analysis of internal legal statements that portrays speakers of such statements as aiming at initiation or maintenance of a certain form of coordination with their audiences. Some have argued that expressivist analyses fail to distinguish clearly normative statements from attempts to goad or prod the audience in various nonrational ways. This chapter's analysis enables us to make this distinction clearly, at least for internal legal statements, and also thereby enables us to maintain H.L.A. Hart's view that legal practices are fundamentally different from the kind of coercion‐centered practices that Jeremy Bentham and John Austin conceived legal practices as being.

Keywords: expressivism; H.L.A. Hart; internal legal statements; plural acceptance of norms

Chapter.  12272 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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