Chapter

Self‐Defense: The Imminence Requirement

Marcia Baron

in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law

Published in print June 2011 | ISBN: 9780199606443
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729683 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606443.003.0007

Series: Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law

Self‐Defense: The Imminence Requirement

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This chapter defends the position that the imminence requirement should be jettisoned. What matters is that it was necessary to use self‐defensive force against an aggressor. Imminence is important evidentially: it helps us answer the question of necessity. The imminence requirement should be replaced with a necessity requirement, probably with the stipulation of a rebuttable presumption that the necessity requirement is not met if the danger was not imminent. The chapter defends this position against arguments by Dressler and Ferzan in support of retaining the imminence requirement; the chapter also tries to figure out why the obvious fact that imminence does not entail necessity has been overlooked, or ignored.

Keywords: self‐defense; imminence; battered women; justification; excuse; retreat

Chapter.  17761 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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