Chapter

Coalition Governance and Delegation

Lanny W. Martin and Georg Vanberg

in Parliaments and Coalitions

Published in print July 2011 | ISBN: 9780199607884
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729676 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199607884.003.0002

Series: Comparative Politics

Coalition Governance and Delegation

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This chapter develops the theoretical argument of the book. A simple game-theoretic model illustrates that electoral competition, and the need for parties to take positions that appeal to their constituents, imply that ministers face temptations to abuse their policymaking influence to undermine coalition compromise agreements. The conditions under which coalition governments will scrutinize, and if necessary amend, ministerial draft legislation are explored.

Keywords: coalition; delegation; principal–agent problems; position-taking

Chapter.  10007 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Comparative Politics

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